Who is the winner of 1965 war

The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful, and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate. This time, the international politics of the Cold War affected the nature of the conflict. The United States had a history of ambivalent relations with India. During the s, U. The United States hoped to maintain a regional balance of power, which meant not allowing India to influence the political development of other states. However, a border conflict between India and China ended with a decisive Chinese victory, which motivated the United States and the United Kingdom to provide military supplies to the Indian Army.

After the clash with China, India also turned to the Soviet Union for assistance, which placed some strains on U. However, the United States also provided India with considerable development assistance throughout the s and s. The Pakistani army managed to repulse a takeover of Lahore, made advances in the deserts of Rajasthan and came perilously close to taking over Akhnoor in the Jammu region.

But the gains were not substantial for either side and after the ceasefire, India and Pakistan met at Tashkent in January where they agreed to withdraw to their pre-war positions. Over the years, both sides have claimed victory. Pakistan even celebrates 6 September every year as "Defence of Pakistan Day" with a gun salute and a victory parade. Indians meanwhile believe that their forces had the clear upper hand.

This gave them confidence which led to their decisive victory in the war against Pakistan," said Mr Gokhale. At least three independent authors believed India had an upper hand in the war:. Pakistan continues to observe 6 September as "defence day", but the zest and gusto associated with the celebrations has dampened in recent decades.

One reason is the passing of the generation. Secondly, the threat of militant attacks during the last ten years have forced military parades, air shows and armament displays to become more low key. Another is that an alternative view of the chronology and consequences of the war has gained more currency in Pakistan.

Earlier it was believed that the war had been initiated by India with a view to capturing Lahore and breaking Pakistan. He was known to be in close contact with Qayum Khan, and through him, with Jinnah. He was not taken with the idea of British officers in the Indian and Pakistani army fighting each other on the war front.

This indicates that there was some underhand intent from the British to force Kashmir to join Pakistan. I am going to help. Crossed Sword by Shuja Nawaz. It was Lieutenant-General Douglas Gracey who took over from Messervy in February who reportedly disobeyed direct orders from Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, for the deployment of the army units, and ultimately issued standing orders that refrained the units of regular Pakistan Army to further participate in the conflict.

Lord Mountbatten agreed with Gracey. Thus rose the idea of war by proxy without the official sanction and use of the army.

Tribal leaders and ex-servicemen, some belonging to the erstwhile Indian National Army INA , were mustered and armed with weapons to invade Kashmir. In this, there was some supervision of Pakistani army officers, too. Incidentally, a proper appreciation was written by an officer Colonel Sher Khan of the military operations branch for this operation, which General Gracey had objected to. The initial phases were a great success, but the offensive lost its way when the raiders became more interested in looting.

The analysis was that had there been more discipline and a stronger command and control, Kashmir would have been part of Pakistan. The lesson was driven home when Gilgit-Baltistan was handed over to Pakistan by a British officer-in-charge of troops in the region. Two strategic lessons were learnt. First, a nation could go to war without using its army and officially denying its involvement. Second, mercenaries, motivated by ideology, had the potential to achieve far greater results with minimum costs involved.

The victory against the Russians in Afghanistan and the continued attempts to retake Kashmir have reaffirmed their faith in this strategy. Also read: Nawaz Sharif is no political suicide bomber.

His attack on Bajwas of Pakistan is deliberate. The strategy was designed for both the eastern and western borders of West Pakistan. East was to acquire Kashmir and towards the west, the idea was to control Afghanistan. Second was the India-China war, which suggested that the Indian Army was in a poor state and would not withstand an offensive by the Pakistanis.

The strategy for the capture of Kashmir involved an initial phase of a proxy war to break the Indian administrative control inside the state, tie down the army and then launch a conventional war through an offensive to cut off the road links to the valley.

The first part was Operation Gibraltar — a brilliant concept, based on the infiltration of trained guerrillas under Pakistan Army officers into Indian-held Kashmir to help foment local dissent and an uprising. They were then to take over the airfield and radio station and proclaim a revolutionary council, followed by a request for help from Pakistan.

This would justify the war and be the signal for Pakistani forces to cross the ceasefire line to help the Kashmiris. The second part of the plan, Operation Grand Slam, was to launch an offensive through Akhnoor, a key chokepoint on the only land route between India and Kashmir, and isolate the Valley. It was typically a hybrid operation with astute strategy. The whole strategy fell apart when India expanded the war to Lahore and towards Chawinda. Operation Grand Slam failed to achieve its stated aim.

This was to be the story of the wider war with India as tactical brilliance and gallantry at the lower levels of the Pakistani command were nullified by a lack of vision and courage among the higher levels of leadership of the Pakistan Army.

Also read: Pakistan Army emotionally blackmails its population with its own idea of India. The strategy of the war was a riposte from West Pakistan into the Indian territory, seeking to forestall an Indian decision in East Pakistan and draw international intervention. There was no strategy in East Pakistan because it was already lost in the failed handling of the situation, both politically and militarily. Pakistan had a two-phase plan for its operations in the western theatre.

In Phase I, its formations from the north to south, were to attack with a view to protect Pakistani territory, while forcing India to commit its troops, particularly in northern Punjab and Kashmir.

In Phase 2, a counterpunch was to be launched by 2 Corps in the area south of the Sutlej River, thrusting deep into the soft underbelly of the Indian Punjab and threatening its key towns as well as supply routes to Kashmir.

The operation for Pakistan petered out very fast and they could not launch Phase 2 of their strategy. Critical analysis was conducted by the Pakistan Army, which concluded that the institutions of higher defence management were overshadowed by personalities and the inability of the seniors to orchestrate the battle at operational level. Hubris was the cause of failure. In , India conducted a war game, Operation Brass Tacks, which demonstrated a full-fledged war as opposed to a limited war with decisive victory for the Indian forces.

This seemed to rattle the Pakistan Army. So, they conducted Operation Zarb-e-Momin with the aim to send a message to the Indians that Pakistan had the capability and resolve to carry out effective defence against Indian aggression, and carry the fight into Indian territory. From here on, Pakistan began to compress the conventional war sphere, aiming to avoid a conflict. To do so, they enlarged their unconventional sphere hybrid war and expanded the nuclear threat by reducing their threshold and introduced the threat of tactical nuclear weapons.

Hubris gave way to pragmatism. Also read: Pakistan govt publicly justifies terrorism as a policy, says External Affairs Minister Jaishankar. India will celebrate the 50th anniversary of its war with Pakistan from August 28 to September Pictured above: Indian soldiers patrol the Line of Control. Here is what happened in Pakistan launched a secret mission to send 30, armed men into Indian-administered Kashmir so as to incite an insurgency and liberate Kashmir from India.

This was known as Operation Gibraltar. By the time Indian forces realized this had happened, the fighters had reached the outskirts of Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir.

As the Indian military offensive seemed to gain success, the Indian Army captured the Haji Pir pass inside Pakistan-administered Kashmir. To counter this, the Pakistani Army launched an attack in Akhnoor in Jammu. Suffering losses here, India called its air force. The escalation of the war here made India open a front in Wagah in Punjab - to the surprise of the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis repelled this attack well. Eventually, the international community forced a ceasefire and the two countries signed an agreement in Tashkent, whereby both returned to pre territorial positions.

Since Pakistan's plan to liberate Kashmir failed, and the year ended with Pakistan getting not a single inch of new territory, the Indians say they won. Independent historians, however, are clear that it was a military stalemate and neither side won. Not every match has a winner or a loser, some end in a draw. It is perhaps apt that both India and Pakistan say they won this war, showing up each other's nationalism for what it is.

India's own official history of the war, published only two years ago, is scathing in its review of how poorly the Indian army and air force performed.